We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm's risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3): 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further, the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.
Introduction
In many regulatory settings, neither the regulator nor the firm has precise information about their project at the time of contracting. For example, when a gas company plans to construct a natural gas pipeline to transport gas to its market, initially both the regulator and the gas company may have incomplete information about the costs, technical specifications, and the environmental impact of the project. Similarly, a telephone company which is about to undertake network investment to increase its transmission speed and/or bandwidth, or a regulated water supply company which is about to implement new procedures to improve the purity of its water, may also C. Dai (B) Department of Economics, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, IL 62901, USA e-mail: daic@siu.edu have incomplete information about the project at the outset. However, as the project progresses, the firm will discover more information, such as the costs and the technical complexity, of the project.
The intent of this research is to examine the optimal regulatory policy for a riskaverse firm under incomplete and asymmetric information. The information environment considered here is one in which neither the firm nor the regulator initially knows with certainty the firm's efficiency parameter for a project. After the regulator and the firm have negotiated a contract, the firm can discover its efficiency parameter before choosing its cost reduction effort. The regulator can observe the firm's output and production cost but not its efficiency parameter and cost reduction effort. Therefore, we study a situation with both adverse selection and moral hazard for a risk-averse firm.
The research also shed light on other contractual relationships that require a simultaneous treatment of adverse selection, moral hazard, and risk aversion, such as sharecropping, insurance, managerial compensation, etc. For example, buyers of automobile insurance typically do not have perfect information about their risks of being in an accident, which could depend on weather conditions, traffic conditions, road conditions, etc., when they purchase their auto insurances. They determine the amount of care to exert after they purchase their insurance contracts and are better informed about their potential risks. Similarly, in sharecropping, at the time of contracting both the landlord and the tenants may not have precise information about the costs and the outcome of the production, which could depend on the future cost of materials and future weather conditions. The tenants choose the amount of time and effort they put into the production after they obtain more information of the production.
Laffont and Tirole (1986) (L&T henceforth) examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-neutral firm who is perfectly and privately informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. Our analysis differ from L&T in two dimensions. First, we examine a situation where both the regulator and the firm are imperfectly informed about the firm's efficiency parameter at the time of contracting. We model a sequential contracting process where the firm chooses contract terms gradually over time as it discovers more information about its efficiency parameter. Second, we examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm. Therefore, we extend L&T to situations requiring a simultaneous treatment of moral hazard, adverse selection, and risk-sharing, such as the regulation of small firms. Dai et al. (2006) study how owners optimally contract with risk-neutral managers who are privately, but imperfectly informed of market conditions at the time of contracting. They show that the owner's ability to benefit from a manager's expertise depends on the contracting sequence employed. When all contract terms are negotiated after the manager has completed his forecast of market conditions, the owner may benefit little or not at all from a manager's expertise. On the other hand, when contract terms are determined gradually as the manager acquires information about market conditions, the owner always benefits from a manager's expertise. In contrast to Dai et al. (2006) , we examine a sequential contracting process for a risk-averse manager. Since the sequential contracting process subjects a manager to future uncertainties at the time of contracting, we study how the manager's degree of risk aversion changes the regulator's preference for contracting sequence.
